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Abstract
From Edward Coke to Henry Maine, the discussions on 
the “legal fiction” gradually rose from the practical level 
to the intellectual level, and the discussants themselves 
have changed their positions, from users or makers of 
legal fictions to pure observers, with different view-points. 
The nature of a fiction is always falsehood according to 
its definition, but scholars made different judgments on its 
role in English legal history. William Blackstone praised 
legal fictions, but Jeremy Bentham denounced them as 
tools by which the judges and lawyers stole legislative 
power. Henry Maine gave his definition of legal fictions 
and emphasized their historical role.
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INTRODUCTION
In western legal traditions, the term “legal fiction” seems 
to have some kind of magic, and the notion behind it is 
unique in the history of western laws.1 The word “fiction”, 
derived from the Latin verb fingere, refers to the act of 
1 Today, “legal fiction” is still an important topic, not only in 
jurisprudence, but also in those expanded fields of linguistics, 
psychology and philosophy, where various tools are used in 
researches. 
feigning, and the product of that act. In its common sense, 
a fiction is just a “lie” or a “falsehood”. The “legal fiction” 
in English law has also been expressed as fictio legis or 
fictio iuris, and fictio legis is commonly found in classical 
Roman literature. In Roman law, a “fictio” always means 
inventing or making a fact which is not true. Fictio iuris 
is rare in classical Roman law, but common in works of 
Medieval scholars on Roman law. The earlier English 
examples mentioned below suggest that the English legis 
fictio or iuris fictio refers to a fiction established in the 
judicial process, the validity of which the law recognizes, 
although it is not true. 
In England, jurists between the 16th and 19th century 
often focused upon legal fictions—from St. Germain 
Christopher to Sir Henry Maine, writers presented 
numerous works and law reports concerning the topic of 
legal fiction. Those jurists often held different attitudes 
to this topic; they have great differences and even open 
conflicts upon legal fictions. Since all of their sayings 
have the same historical background and material basis, it 
seems that a brief analysis of the intellectual history will 
be logical and reasonable. After Henry Maine, scholars in 
the common law world in the 20th century—especially in 
American jurists, have written numerous works on legal 
fictions, specifically or incidentally,2 among which L.L. 
Fuller’s long paper with the title “Legal Fictions” is most 
famous and useful. 
This paper, based on those authorities, will focus on 
the materials and scholars’ interpretations to them, then 
try to profile the intellectual history upon this topic.
1. LEGAL FICTIONS IN ENGLISH LAWS
Legal fictions have existed in English laws for centuries, 
2 We can find a lot of shiny names in the list: Roscoe Pound, 
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, Guido Calabresi, S. F. C. Milsom, J. H. 
Baker, and so on. 
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and persons studying legal knowledge face them at every 
turn. The King’s Bench wanted to extend its jurisdiction 
to old personal actions, mainly debt/detinue, which had 
been within the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas, and 
the King’s Bench developed a procedure by the Bill of 
Middlesex, “the use of violence and weapons” in actions 
of trespass vi et armis, John Doe and Richard Roe in 
Ejectment, Common Recovery which is similar to iure 
cessio at the Roman law, loss and finding goods in Trover, 
and so on. Professor Fuller classified these fictions into 
“historical fictions” and “non-historical fictions”.3 
Generally speaking, there are three kinds of fictions 
in English law, the first one is fabricating facts which are 
essential to the causes of actions, and it is closely related 
to analogy; the second one involves jurisdiction matters 
such as the criminal charges against the defendant in the 
bill of Middlesex, and those charges often were made up 
with no factual basis. The last one existed in the abuse 
of procedures, where the acts or facts were not false, 
but were used for other purposes, just as in Common 
Recovery. 
Since most fictions in procedural matters did not 
directly affect the substantial rights of the litigants, in the 
period of general pleading, these fictions might establish 
calm and well, and rarely affect the substantial rules. The 
fictions concerning the essential facts were created by the 
litigants, especially by plaintiffs. When special pleading 
became common, this kind of fictions often received 
denials by defendants and by juries of their special 
verdicts. So these fictions’ validity was concerned with the 
model of pleading the litigants had chosen, and when the 
special pleading model prevailed, the legitimacy of these 
fictions would be discussed. In common law, this seemed 
to begin no later than the first half of the 15th century; 
and the paragraphs of a book generally called “Dialogues 
between a Doctor and a Student” or “Doctor and Student” 
show that in the early 16th century the rationality of some 
fictions already has been fully discussed.
Most of these three kinds of fictions mentioned above 
were originally based upon certain situations which were 
real, but more and more fictitious facts were made up in 
order to make existing rules applicable to novel cases, and 
this may be called “putting new wine in old bottles”. But 
there also were some fictions set up directly by judges, 
as in cases decided by Sir Edward Coke and his peers. 
Contemporary scholars pay more attention to the latter, 
but most issue points of the “legal fiction” arose out of the 
former.
2. LITERATURE ANALYSIS
In the term “legal fiction”, the meaning of “law (legal)” 
3 See L. L. Fuller, “Legal Fictions”, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 367 et seq., 518 et 
seq., 1930-1931.
has changed on the case since the word “law” in English 
law is different from “lex” in Roman law, while the 
meaning of “fictions” in materials of English legal 
history has always been “falsehood” or “fabrication”. 
The medieval Roman law students have pointed out that 
the legal field of the fiction is “falsi pro vero, aequitate 
Suadente, facta assumptio”.4 This definition has the key 
elements of “falsehood vs. truth” and “fiction vs. equity” 
already, which were reserved in writings by authors down 
to Henry Maine.5 These two factors constitute the clue of 
the following parts.
2.1 The Roman-Canon Law Source of the 
Concept “Legal Fiction”
St. Germain Christopher’s “Doctor and Student”, 
published in the early 16th century, has a chapter to 
discuss the use of “color” (fucus),6 one kind of fictions. 
The Doctor asks that, whether the feigned and untrue 
colors at the common law in various actions stand with 
“conscience”? The Student gives an example to answer 
him that if the defendant gave the plaintiff a color of 
action, the judge will not violate his “conscience”, 
because if any default lies, “it is in the tenant, and not 
in the court”. The Doctor then narrates the nature of the 
“color”, of course using the theological rhetoric and logic. 
Accepting medieval theology’s classification of lies, his 
logic is as follows: People should love neighbors instead 
of hurting them. If a lie is of malice and to hurt a neighbor, 
it is called “mendacium perniciosum”, a deadly sin; if a 
lie is only in sport and does not hurt others, it is called 
“mendacium jocosum”, a venial sin; and of a lie is for 
the interests of neighbors and to hurt no one, it is called 
“mendacium officiosum”, also a venial sin; although it is 
a slight evil which should be avoided, but the slightest of 
the three.7
Under the subject of “legal fiction”, the importance 
4 Quoted in I. Maclean, I. (1992). Interpretation and meaning in 
the renaissance: The case of law (p.138). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; cf Nancy E. Wright, “Legal Fictions and 
Interpretation in Attorney General v Pickeringe (1605) and Ben 
Jonson’s Masque of Queenes (1609)”, 1 Newcastle L. Rev. 55-72, 
1995-1996 at 56.
5 These two groups of concepts had kept their importance until 
Germany jurisprudence changed the definition of “legal ficiton”. The 
relationship between falsehood and truth is critical to the definition 
of fiction. It is self-evident that when they have the same value and 
function, the truth is always higher than falsehood; if applying rules 
according to the truth could provide enough relief, the fiction is not 
allowed to use. It can be seen in a lexicon in the middle of the 19th 
century, under the item of “legal fiction”, as follows: “Fictio cedit 
veritati. Fictio juris non est ubi veritas.” See J. J. S. Wharton, The 
Law Lexicon or Dictionary of Jurisprudence, I. G. M’Kinley & J. 
M. G. Lescure, 1848, p.386.
6 It is from the Latin verb fucare, the original meaning of which is “to 
paint”, and it may refer to a fiction which gives a litigant “a color of 
right”, such as the recognition of a non-existent covenant under seal, 
in order to make the suit go on. 
7 See St. Germain Christopher, St G. (1874). Dialogues between 
a doctor of divinity and a student in the laws of England (p.269 et 
seq.). Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co.
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of the chapter concerning legal fictions in “Doctor and 
Student” is that it communicates the Roman-Canon law 
with the English Equity and the common law, which 
happens in three levels: Firstly, the discussion was 
based upon actions which were real at the common law; 
secondly, the introduction of “conscience” and “goodwill” 
at Equity into the common law as the basis of fictions; 
thirdly, a fiction’s validity is to be determined by the 
answer whether or not it is to harm the neighbors, and this 
standard is an important source of legal maxim “fictio 
legis inique operatur alicui damnum vel injuriam”.
The direct impact of the above-mentioned chapter 
of “Doctor and Student” on later law reports and legal 
writings is not uncommon. A century later, the law report 
of Doctor Leyfield’s Case in 1611 recorded Edward Coke 
and his peers’ discussion on color of right in the action 
of entry sur disseisin, where the judges directly used 
the words from “doctor and student” and made a well-
known legal maxim— “lex figit ubi subsistit aequitas”;8 
and Bentham’s taking fictions as lies is likely influenced 
by the “doctor and student’s” classification of lies. It is 
evident that from the beginning, the formation of the 
English concept of legal fiction has received the influence 
of the Roman-Canon law.
2.2 Edward Coke’s “Legal Fictions”
In Bulter and Baker’s Case in 1592, a husband set up 
a “jointure” estate with his wife during his lifetime, on 
which, for his heir and collateral relatives, he also set 
up complex remainders in the form of Fee Tail. After 
his death his wife gave up in an informal way the right 
on jointure. The key legal issue is that can the effect of 
giving up her right be back to the beginning time-point of 
the husband’s death, in order to make the remainder begin 
immediately? The issue involves the effect of disposing 
act that may occur between a husband and his wife, and 
has an influence on the English Estate system, especially 
on the rules of uses and wills. After discussions of all 
judges of England, a fiction was put forward, that the 
wife’s quitting the jointure has its retroactivity, as if the 
husband had held the property alone until his death. 
There are three interesting points in this report, the first 
of which constitutes the legal maxim “relatio est fictio 
juris, et est intenta ad unum”.9 The second point is that it 
presents the relationship between the legal fiction and the 
fact, that is, a fiction conceals the truth. The third one is 
that it suggests that a fiction has its own aim and limits, so 
the abuse of fictions beyond their purposes is not allowed.
In the Liford’s Case in 1618, Coke established a 
fiction similar to the fiction of relation, in order to provide 
relief for the loss of crops on a freehold land during 
the disseisin. This fiction assumes that the freehold in 
8 Coke, E., et al. (1826). The reports of sir Edward Coke (Vol. V, part 
X, p.409). London: Joseph Butterworth and Son. 
9 Ibid., vol. II, part III, pp.76-7.
question had been uninterrupted, in order to make the 
action of trespass vi et armis available in this case to 
recover the loss caused during disseisin. At the same time, 
Coke set a limit that the effect of this fiction should not 
be extended to apply to the buyer of crops and other third 
parties. Obviously this is an example of a discussion in 
court on the use of legal fictions, about the maxim that a 
fiction can do no damage or injury to others. Coke then 
presented another more famous legal maxim: “In fictione 
juris semper aequitas exisit”.10
In both cases the fictions were not set up by statutes, 
but they were called “legal fictions”, or “ficitones iuris” in 
Latin. Since the word “law” in English generally refers to 
the common law and excludes Equity, the early examples 
of fictiones iuris implied their non-statutory background, 
and we can define the term as “fictions at common law”. 
This suggested that in the minds of Edward Coke and 
other judges, “legal fiction” does not specifically mean 
“statutory fiction”, which were created by statutes. As 
mentioned above, this usage is different from that of the 
classical Roman law. And in both cases Coke referred 
to the existence of equity. He wanted to limit the abuse 
of the fiction, that is, a fiction must have equity in it to 
maintain its legitimacy, and to avoid harming the third 
party. Secondly, equity can be used as a basis to remedy 
the injured in novel cases, just like what happened in 
Chancery.
In addition, we should note that the cases Coke 
recorded reflect the formation of legal fictions. In Coke’s 
time, a legal fiction may emerge from the procedure 
of special pleading, and the lawyers have been able to 
discuss fully the conditions for the establishment and 
application of fictions. Furthermore, the judges were 
frank in creating new fictions, without feeling guilty of 
stealing the legislative power. —More than a century later, 
Bentham made severe attacks on the fictions, taking them 
as the tool by which judges stole legislative power.
2.3 William Blackstone’s “Legal Fictions”
In the 18th century, English legal theory came into a rapid 
developing period, and the “legal fiction” has become an 
important subject. The most influential jurist to later times 
is Sir William Blackstone. In his famous book there are 
two interesting points on the legal fictions.
Firstly, after describing the way in which the civil 
jurisdiction of the King’s Bench expanded from trespass 
actions to old personal actions, Blackstone points out that 
the plea of trespass against the defendant is a fiction and 
the defendant, once being in the custody of the marshal of 
this court, could not be at liberty to dispute. Blackstone 
then puts forward that, 
these fictions of law, though at first they may startle the student, 
he will find upon farther consideration to be highly beneficial 
and useful: Especially as this maxim is ever invariably 
10 Ibid., vol. VI, part XI, 51, p.98.
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observed, that no fiction shall extend to work an injury; it’s 
proper operation being to prevent a mischief, or remedy an 
inconvenience, that might result from the general rule of law. 
So true is it, that in fictione juris semper subsistit aequitas. 
(Blackstone, 1765, p.43)
Here Blackstone quotes a medieval Roman law 
student’s words to show that no proof should be made 
against the fiction—“Contra fictionem non admittitur 
probatio: quid enimgyeret probatio veritatis, ubi fictio 
adversus veritatem fingit? Nam fictio nihil aliud est, 
quamant adversus veritatem In the re possibili ex justa 
causa dispositio.” (Ibid.) This prohibition directly 
constitutes the “fictions are not to be traversed” element 
of the definition of “statutory fiction” in some modern 
writings.11
Secondly, Blackstone mentions that many civil law 
scholars have strongly criticized the absurdity of the 
fictions that contracts which were made at sea had been 
made at the Royal Exchange or other inland place, and Sir 
Thomas Ridley demonstrated that it would be impossible 
for the ship in which such cause of action arises to be 
really at the Royal Exchange. Blackstone objects that Sir 
Thomas Ridley himself is a learned civilian, so he seems 
to have forgotten there are many fictions in the Roman 
law. He then lists several famous Roman legal fictions 
(Blackstone, 1765, p.107).
It should be noted that Blackstone vividly describes 
the controversy arising from the legal fictions. There are 
two points in his description. One is that the fictions were 
at first used in practice in jurisdictional matters, and then 
suffered civilians’ attacks. This once again shows that 
each legal fiction was not necessarily to be established 
without dispute, and debates about whether or not a fiction 
is valid have been always in the legal history.
Obviously Blackstone made a modest positive 
comment on legal fictions. He did not hesitate to quote 
Coke and reminded his students that English fictions 
were helpful if the maxims were kept. The reason why 
Blackstone held this position may be that, the purpose 
of his book is to systematize the existing laws, and since 
English laws have their historical continuity, of the 
British law, to embrace the tradition is almost inevitable. 
Blackstone was influenced by the Roman law and some 
parts of his writings (especially the theoretical analysis 
part) has the color of the natural law. So his holding a 
positive evaluation is natural.
2.4 Jeremy Bentham’s “Legal Fictions”
As Blackstone’s praise of the legal fiction is widely 
known, Jeremy Bentham’s criticism is also very striking. 
11 It is worth noting that the words Blackstone quotes come from 
the Geneva scholar Jakob Gothofred’s commentaries on the Roman 
law in the first half of the 17th century, rather than from the classical 
Roman law. This not only reflects the influence of Roman law 
on Blackstone, but also provides a way for the understanding the 
medieval Roman law studies. 
In different periods and different works he repeatedly 
denounced the fictions. Fuller’s “Legal Fictions” has 
discussed Bentham’s views in detail, but paid less 
attention to the logic of his argument. In fact, Bentham’s 
argument is consistent and coherent, and has great 
influence on the development of the theory of legal fiction 
in Anglo-American law, albeit indirectly. So a brief 
description of Bentham’s ideas is necessary.
2.4.1 Definition of “Legal Fiction”
In the preface of his famous pamphlet “A Fragment on 
Government”, Jeremy Bentham, after pointing out the 
problems of the existing judicial system, derives his 
definition of a legal fiction: Bentham argues that the social 
contract put forward by John Locke and Whig’s thinkers 
is a fictitious contract, which is derived from the legal 
language, and a fiction of law can be defined as “a willful 
falsehood, having for its object the stealing legislative 
power, by and for hands which could not, or durst not, 
openly claim it, —and, but for the delusion thus produced, 
could not exercise it.” (Bowring, 1843, pp.242-3) Thus 
according to Bentham, legal fictions are tools used to steal 
legislative power by persons who do not have that power, 
that is, by judges. 
The “A Fragment on Government” was written to 
refute Blackstone. As mentioned above, Blackstone has 
a very positive attitude to legal fictions; while Bentham’s 
definition is opposite to him. This definition includes 
the intention of stealing the legislative power, and this 
charge must be in the context of separation of powers of 
governance, which may meet Bentham’s reforming claim 
but against the real English constitutions. Obviously, the 
legal fictions Bentham wrote about were all in the judicial 
sphere.
Blackstone, in his “Commentaries on the Laws of 
England” presented his respect to the common law 
tradition, for this book was mainly based upon historical 
materials. On the contrary, Bentham denied the whole 
argument of Blackstone by attacking the basis of the 
common law. He once mentioned that there was a 
maxim among the judges that right and wrong were 
creatures of their creation, and of which the existence 
is at all times dependent upon their pleasure, so by a 
judge’s encouragement or punishment, the virtue may 
become vice and vice may become virtue (Bentham, 
1843, p.100). So in Bentham’s eyes it was true that 
English law was judge-made law, and fictions were 
materials with which the judges built the structure of the 
whole legal system.12 
2.4.2 Bentham’s Judgment
In the book “Rationale of Judicial Evidence”, Bentham 
gives a whole chapter to legal fictions. He at first takes 
12 Of course, the fictions were not the whole materials. even if 
Bentham once regarded the common law as a purely fictitious 
product, he did not deny that there was some non-fictitious part. 
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legal fictions as one of the various tools to seize the 
judicial interests in English laws. From this view, he 
believes that the a fiction’s effect is harmful and its 
purpose is evil. Then he enumerates the fictions created by 
judges and those by litigants, and fictions for seizing the 
jurisdiction, and then points out the nine negative effects 
of fictions, including the wrong statement of the parties, 
the court’s wrong instructions and jury’s false verdicts, 
the judges’ being arbitrary, making law unclear, and so on. 
Bentham finally accuses that lawyers refuse to administer 
justice to people unless the people join with them in the 
fictions, and calls for further considerations on the cause 
(Bentham, 1843, pp.283-7). Bentham’s enumerating the 
types of fictions shows his familiarity with English law, 
and that is different from the case in which Blackstone 
only mentioned the fictions in jurisdictional matters. 
Furthermore, Bentham’s classification of fictions is still 
important in our time, but has not been paid enough 
attention yet. 
In short, Bentham’s view on legal fictions is quite 
coherent and consistent. Bentham’s criticisms on legal 
fictions show his extreme dissatisfaction with English 
judicial system of his time; therefore, the judges’ 
implementing legal fictions is just a target; by firing at this 
target he could attack the whole English judicial system. 
In a nutshell, the ultimate target of Bentham’s attack is 
not legal fictions, but the judges and mechanisms through 
which they would appropriate legislative power.
2.5 Henry Maine’s “Legal Fictions”
In the 19th century, the judicial reform in English for 
which Bentham had strongly advocated, began after his 
death. Standing at the end of an era, Henry Maine was 
able to look back, describe a more colorful legal history 
and explain it. Naturally he would face the legal fictions 
which were important in both Roman law and English 
law.
In his book “Ancient Law”, Maine advanced a 
general proposition that there are three agencies by 
which law is brought into harmony with society, 
namely the legal fictions, Equity and legislation. Maine 
thought these three agencies have their historical order 
as here he placed them. He discussed some examples 
of fictions in the Roman law and the English law, then 
gave his definition of “legal fiction”—the expression of 
“legal fiction” means “any assumption which conceals, 
or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has 
undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, 
its operation being modified”. Below this definition 
he pointed out the historical role of legal fictions, that 
is, in the infancy of society, “they satisfy the desire for 
improvement, which is not quite wanting, at the same 
time that they do not offend the superstitious disrelish 
for change which is always present. At a particular stage 
of social progress they are invaluable expedients for 
overcoming the rigidity”; but when the society develops 
into a higher stage and no longer needs fictions, 
they become the greatest obstacle to symmetrical 
classification (Maine, 1871, pp.24-6).
Maine’s narration has a clear skeleton: firstly, his 
definition of legal fictions is different from the traditional 
definition. The premise of his definition is that there exist 
three agencies by which people can bring the law into 
harmony with society, and these three agencies emerge in 
a certain order. Therefore, the legal fictions’ emergence 
is to keep the appearances of the old rules. We can say 
that Maine’s definition of legal fictions is based on their 
function as an agency between law and society.13
Secondly, Maine, as a historical jurist, paid more 
attention to the historical evaluation of legal fictions. He 
not only took the legal fiction as one of the three agencies 
for the coordination of law and social development, 
but also pointed out that they were used to maintain the 
balance between stability and satisfying the desire to 
improve and overcome the rigid role of the law; he not 
only pointed out the progressive role of the fictions, but 
also pointed out that in his time, legal fictions were no 
longer needed. It is important for us to remember that 
although Maine criticized Bentham for his stigmatizing 
the legal fictions (Ibid., p.26), but his emphasis that every 
legal fiction has its own time is similar to Bentham—
Bentham has mentioned that the fiction may have its 
own season, but in his time the season had passed away. 
It can also be seen, therefore, that the Maine’s view on 
legal fictions contains the implication of responding to 
Bentham.
As his “ancient law” has been widely circulated, 
Maine’s view on “legal fiction” has far-reaching 
influence. In fact, in the Anglo-American law world, the 
most influential works on legal fictions, such as Fuller’s 
“Legal Fictions”, do not go beyond Maine in respects of 
the definition and functional evaluation of legal fictions. 
For example, Fuller did not quote Maine’s positive and 
useful discussion on the historical role of the fictions, but 
in fact reaffirmed the view of Maine—Fuller came to an 
approximate conclusion to Maine, but he did not elaborate 
on the relation between his view point and Maine’s. In 
other words, the classic expression of Maine is still a 
strong support for the idea that legal fictions are means to 
remedy the injured in judicial process.
The views of legal fictions put forward by Edward 
Coke, William Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Henry 
Maine and other scholars were accepted by more and 
more students in the later times, for the early dictionaries 
which were used to collecting novel views were widely 
circulated. For example, not long after the publication of 
Blackstone’s great book, under the title Fiction of Law 
in a law dictionary compiled by Richard Burn and John 
13 Fuller argues that the definition by Maine omitted the non-
historical fictions. See L. L. Fuller, “Legal Fictions”, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 
513-46, 1930-1931, 518.
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Burn, Blackstone’s narration was collected.14 And at the 
end of the 19th century, in the item of “legal fiction” the 
views of Maine, Bentham, Stephen and other scholars 
were quoted (Renton, 1897, pp.335-6). These works have 
contributed to the improvement of contemporary scholars’ 
understanding of fiction.
CONCLUSION
After a brief analysis of the intellectual history of 
“legal fiction”, now we can picture the development as 
follows: 
Firstly, in the 16th century, the basic element, that is, 
the falsehood, in the classical definition of “legal fiction” 
has become popular, but the English “legal fiction” 
was different from the Roman “legis fictio”, because in 
England the fictions got their validity from the common 
law rather than the statutes, but this difference has 
not been reviewed from the beginning. Being used by 
Edward Coke, William Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham and 
others, this term has had its English implication, so its 
meaning in the Anglo-American law is different from that 
in the Roman law, and this is a key to understand these 
two legal systems.
Secondly, the rise of English legal fictions is mainly 
due to changes of models of pleadings, especially to 
emergence of the special pleading. The discussions in 
“Doctor and Student” and Edward Coke’s law reports 
have provided clear examples. General pleadings 
concealed the use of the fictions, while special pleadings 
were necessary to confirm their validity. This is the 
institutional foundation of the legal fictions.
Thirdly, the reason why the change of the mechanism 
is accepted is the introduction of the conception of 
equity, which also is the basis of legal fictions. The 
academic works and law reports of the 16th and 17th 
centuries show the equity factor always has been in 
the definition of “legal fiction”. This is the conceptual 
foundation of the legal fictions.
Fourthly, a legal fiction does not justify itself without 
necessary argument; and sometimes even fictions have 
established well, scholars challenged their rationality, 
just as in the controversy Blackstone described between 
common law scholars and civilians—the latter focused on 
14 See Burn, R., &  Burn, J. (1792). A New Law Dictionary (Vol. I, 
p.362), item Fiction of Law.
the absurdity of legal fictions, rather than their equitable 
nature.
Fifthly, Blackstone took legal fictions as useful things 
while Bentham attacked them strongly, taking them as 
typical corruptions of the legal system. Bentham’s view 
on legal fictions was attached to his disgust at the English 
law as a whole, and he succeeded in making “legal 
fiction” a theme to which the scholars have paid, and are 
paying more and more attention.
Among all the reactions to the method of Bentham, 
Maine’s view insisted on the historical standard, and 
placed legal fictions, equity and legislation together as 
means to bring the law into harmony with society. His 
view was partly based upon examples in the classical 
Roman law, so he gave a definition slightly different from 
others; but its emphasis on historical characters is still 
useful today.
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